




By incentive reversal we refer to situations in which an increase of rewards for all
agents results in fewer agents exerting eﬀort. We show that externalities among peers
may give rise to such intriguing situations even when all agents are fully rational.
We provide a necessary and suﬃcient condition on the organizational technology in
order for it to be susceptible to incentive reversal. The condition implies that some
degree of complementarity is enough to allow incentive reversal.
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1 Introduction
The eﬀect of rewards on performance is central to almost any debate on the optimal
functioning of organizations. Rewards, if contingent on performance, can be used to boost
agents’ incentives to exert eﬀort. Much of the principal-agent literature and the more
recent literature on contract theory is based on this principle. The objective of this paper
is to demonstrate that in a team environment rewards may aﬀect performance in a non-
monotonic way. Put diﬀerently, a promise to reward agents more generously in the case of
success may paradoxically reduce agents’ incentives to exert eﬀort. We will provide this
argument in a framework of fully rational agents, without building on any psychological
argument, or making any behavioral assumption. The argument we provide builds on the
externalities among agents and uses a very simple moral hazard model in which agents’
eﬀort decisions are mapped into a probability of success for the joint project. We show that
increasing rewards for all agents can result in the shirking of the set of agents who exert
eﬀort. In fact, the eﬀect can be so dramatic that under low rewards all agents exert eﬀort
while under higher rewards almost all of them shirk. An increase in reward can change an
agent’s strategic consideration by making an eﬀort decision become a dominant strategy.
Suppose that under the low set of incentives agent i ﬁnds it rational to exert eﬀort only
when he observes some of his peers doing so, but under the high set of incentives he would
choose to exert eﬀort regardless of his peers’ actions. In such a scenario the increase of
incentives on part of agent i may rationally decrease the willingness to exert eﬀort on the
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1p a r to ft h o s ew h o mh eo b s e r v e s .I fe ﬀort becomes a dominant strategy for agent i those
whom he observe lose the endogenous incentives imposed by agent i. Consequently, the set
of players exerting eﬀort in equilibrium can shrink dramatically. The main result of this
paper will characterize the technologies susceptible to incentive reversal. Speciﬁcally, we
show that any technology that has increasing returns to scale for some range of production
(i.e., is not concave on the entire range of production) is prone to yield reverse incentives.
Furthermore, we show that if the technology has increasing returns to scale on the entire
range of production, i.e., when it is supermodular, then incentive reversal can take a
dramatic form in which as a result of reward increase all but one agent move from eﬀort
exertion to shirking.For the relationship between supermodularity and complementarity
see Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Topkis (1998) and Segal (2003). The broader implication
of our results and the intuition they provide is that in organizational environments in which
peers have some information about each other’s eﬀort and where workers deal with tasks
that have some degree of complementarity one should be cautious in setting up incentives.
Raising rewards, which naively seems a helpful mean to boost incentives, may have a
reverse eﬀect. 1
While we phrase our results in terms of incentives in organizations, their implications
reach beyond this framework. Incentive reversal of the sort we describe here can arise in
other economic environments. A fund-raiser who elicits donations for a cause should be
cautious in his campaign. Suppose that donors are approached sequentially and that the
cause requires a certain threshold of funds (making the fund-raising technology satisfy
complementarity). Boosting the attractiveness of the cause in a way that would make it a
dominant strategy for late movers to donate may make early movers reluctant to chip in
their contributions. In fact, a phnomenon similar in spirit to the idea of incentive reversal
often takes place in fund raising campaigns. A donation which is contingent on a matching
from a diﬀerent donor often allows fundraisers to raise more money. A similar phenomenon
can arise with a design of environmental incentives for pollution abatement. Raising ﬁnes
in a way that would make abatement a dominant strategy for some may discourage others
to follow suit.
This paper is part of a large literature on incentives in organizations using principal-
multiagent models, much of which stems from Holmstrom’s (1982) seminal paper. Papers
such as Itoh (1991), Baliga and Sjoestrom (1998), Che and Yoo (2001), and Winter (2006b)
discuss the design of optimal incentives in teams and the way they are aﬀected by the
underlying environment (such as information among peers and prospects of collusion). Che
and Yoo (2001) have also pointed to the role of implicit incentives among peers, which has
a central role also in our context. To the best of my knowledge, however, the possibility of
incentive reversal has not been mentioned in this literature, largely because this literature
is concerned with optimal incentive mechanisms, while demonstrating incentive reversal
requires a comparison of two mechanisms at least one of which is suboptimal.
We start in Section 2 by demonstrating incentive reversal with the simplest possible
1Some papers in behavioral economics document empirical evidence of a very diﬀerent type of incentive
reversal. One prominent example is Gneezy and Rustichini’s (2000) evidence on daycare centers. When
daycare centers in Israel introduced small ﬁnes for parents who failed to pick up their kids on time, the
overall eﬀort towards on-time pickup declined. Roughly, the ﬁne was perceived by parents as a convenient
substitute for the shame and embarrassement linked with a late pickup.
2example. We use a two-agent example and show how a 15% increase in rewards for both
agents shifts the equilibrium in the organization from full eﬀort to 50% eﬀort. In Section 3
we set up a simple model of moral hazard similar to ones used in Winter (2004) and Winter
(2006a) and deﬁne the notion of incentive reversal. In Section 4 we provide necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for incentive reversal in the two-agent case, which will be used as
an intermediary result towards the general case. Section 5 provides a characterization of
incentive reversal for arbitrary number of agents, and shows that its form is made severe
with increasing returns to scale. We conclude in Section 6.
2E x a m p l e
Two agents form a team to manage a joint project with each of them in charge of a diﬀerent
task. Each agent can either shirk or exert eﬀort. If an agent exerts eﬀo r th ep e r f o r m sh i s
task successfully with certainty. If he shirks his task succeeds with probability α < 1.
The common cost of eﬀort is c. The joint project will succeed if and only if both tasks
end successfully. The principal who can neither monitor agents’ eﬀort nor the outcome
of individual tasks oﬀers the agents rewards that are contingent only on the project’s
outcome. Speciﬁcally, if the project suceeds, agent 1 gets v1 and agent 2 gets v2, and they
both get zero if the project fails.
Assume now that agents move sequentially. Agent 1 acts ﬁrst and agent 2 observes
agent 10s eﬀort decision (but not the outcome of his task) and makes his own eﬀort decision.
We wish to raise the following question: Is it possible that higher rewards for both agents
will generate less eﬀort in equilibrium?
Let us set α =0 .9 , c =1 , and assume ﬁrst that v1 =5 .5 and v2 =1 1 .I ti se a s yt o
verify that under these rewards both agents exert eﬀort in the unique (subgame-perfect)
equilibrium of the game. Player 2’s optimal strategy is to exert eﬀort if and only if player
1e x e r t se ﬀort (which follows from the fact that v2−c> αv2, and αv2−c<α2v2). Player
1’s optimal strategy is therefore to exert eﬀort (since v1 − c>α2v1).
Suppose now that the principal raises the rewards of both agents by 15%, yielding
v∗
1 =6 .33 and v∗
2 =1 2 .66. It is now a dominant strategy for agent 2 to exert eﬀort (since
α2v∗
2 < αv∗
2 − c ). But now the ﬁrst agent, who realizes that the second will invest no
matter what agent 1 is doing, loses his incentive to exert eﬀort: αv∗
1 >v ∗
1 − c.T h u s ,t h e
unique equilibrium of the game yields only player 2 investing. Hence, the principal spent
more money and got less eﬀort.
In the sequel of the paper we will characterize the technologies under which such
reverse incentives can happen.
3 The Model
The organizational project involves a set N of n identical agents who collectively manage a
project. The project involves a sequential production. Each agent in his turn has to decide
whether to exert eﬀort in the performance of his tasks or not. We denote by di =1agent
i0s decision to exert eﬀort and by di =0his decision to shirk. When an agent is making his
3eﬀort decision he is informed about the eﬀort decisions of all his peers who acted earlier.
The cost of eﬀort is c and is constant across all players. The technology of the organization
maps a proﬁle of eﬀort decisions into a probability of the project’s success. We denote by
p(s) the probability that the project succeeds if exactly s agents exert eﬀort and n − s
shirk. The technology is assumed to be increasing, i.e., if s1 >s 2 then p(s1) >p (s2).
The principal who cannot monitor the agents for their eﬀort but knows only the
project’s outcome sets up a mechanism v =( v1,...,vn) by which agent i receives the payoﬀ
vi if the project succeeds and zero otherwise. 2 For a given mechanism v players are facing
a perfect information game.
Denoting by Ti the set of agents preceding agent i in the order of moves, we can
specify the game formally as follows. The strategy for player i is a function σi: 2Ti −→
{0,1} specifying to each player whether to exert eﬀort or to shirk as a function of the infor-
mation he possesses on other agents’ decisions. For every strategy proﬁle σ =( σ1,...,σn)
we denote by E(σ) the set of agents who exert eﬀort under the proﬁles σ. Finally, the
payoﬀ for player i under σ =( σ1,...,σn) is given by fi(σ)=vip(E(σ)) − c if i ∈ E(σ) and
fi(σ)=vip(E(σ)) if i/ ∈ E(σ). Generically, the extensive form game described above has a
unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. For the non-generic case we assume that indiﬀerences
are resolved in favor of exerting eﬀort. We denote by E(v) the set of agents who exert
eﬀort in equilibrium under the reward vector v.
By incentive reversal we refer to situations in which an increase of rewards for all
the agents results with the shrinkage of the (equilibrium) set of investing agents. Formally,
we say that the technology p is susceptible to reverse incentives if there exist two reward
vectors v1,v 2 such that v1 <v 2 (coordinatewise) and yet E(v1) ! E(v2). If p is not
susceptible to reverse incentives we will say that it is immune to reverse incentives.
Two properties of the technology p will play an important role in our analysis. We
say that p satisﬁes increasing returns to scale (IRS) if D(k)=p(k+1)−p(k) is increasing
in k. We say that p satisﬁes decreasing returns to scale (DRS) if D(k) is weakly decreasing
in k. The properties of IRS and DRS correspond to the convexity and the concavity of the
technology p respectively. The IRS condition represents situations with complementarity
across agents’ tasks since the higher an agent’s marginal contribution, the more other agents
contribute. In contrast, DRS represents substitution across tasks since eﬀort becomes less
eﬀective the more agents contribute. If there are only two agents in the organization p
must have either DRS or IRS. We examine this case in detail in the next section.
4 The Two-agent Case
The intriguing situation of incentive reversal that we demonstrated in Section 2 relied
on the complementarity of the two tasks that form the project. In this section we show
that complementarity is both a necessary and suﬃcient condition for incentive reversal in
the two-agent case. We will later address the case of an arbitrary number of agents to
characterize incentive reversal, and will use the analysis in this section as a step in the
proof for the general case.
2Zero payment in case of failure is a standard assumption of limited liability.
4Proposition 1 :I fn =2 ,t h e np is susceptible to reverse incentives if and only if it
has IRS.
We ﬁrst show that incentive reversal implies IRS.
Lemma 1:I ff o rs o m ev1 <v 2 we have E(v1) ! E(v2) then the technology p has
IRS.
Proof:I fE(v1) ! E(v2), then the vector of equilibrium actions under v2 cannot be
(1,1) and is therefore either (0,0),(0,1), or (1,0). We will now distinguish cases.
Case 1: The equilibrium actions under v1 are (1,1). Since under v1 both exerted
eﬀort it must be the case that player 2’s best response to an eﬀort by player 1 under v1 is
to exert eﬀort. So this must also be the case under v2.H e n c e ,(1,0) i sn o tp o s s i b l eu n d e r
v2.A l s o (0,0) i sn o tp o s s i b l eb e c a u s eg i v e nt h a tp l a y e r1 knows that player 2 will exert
eﬀort if he does so, he should ﬁnd it optimal to exert eﬀort under v2. Hence, (0,1) is the
only possible case. So under v1 the equilibrium outcome is (1,1) and under v2 >v 1 it is
(0,1). This must be because player 2’s strategy under v1 is to invest if and only if player
1 invests. Otherwise, player 1 would chose to shirk under v1 as he did under v2.H e n c e ,
p(2)v1
2 − c>p (1)v1
2 and p(1)v1





p(1)−p(0),o rp(2) − p(1) >p (1) − p(0),w h i c hm e a n sI R S .
Case 2: The equilibrium actions under v1 are (0,1). I nt h i sc a s ei tm u s tb et h a t
under v2 the equilibrium actions are (0,0). This is impossible: if under v1 player 2’s best
response to player 1’s choosing 0 was to choose 1, it should also be the case under v2.
Case 3: The equilibrium actions under v1 are (1,0). Again in this case it must be
that under v2 the equilibrium actions are (0,0). It must be the case that under v1 player
2 chooses 0 regardless of the choice of player 1. Otherwise, if the strategy of 2 had been
to exert eﬀort if player 1 shirked, then the equilibrium action of player 1 would have been
to shirk (assuming symmetry). Consider now the strategy of player 2 under v2. Subcase
1: If player 2’s strategy is to shirk no matter what player 1 is doing, then under v2 player
2m u s te x e r te ﬀo r t( b e c a u s eh ed o e ss ou n d e rv1). Hence, (0,0) cannot be the equilibrium
actions under v2. Subcase 2: If player 2’s strategy under v2 is to exert eﬀort if and only if
player 1 exerts eﬀort, then player 1’s optimal action is to exert eﬀort. This follows from
p(1)v1
1−c>p (0), and hence p(1)v2
1−c>p (0), which implies that p(2)v2
1−c>p (0) because
p is increasing. This again means that (0,0) cannot be the vector of equilibrium actions.
The two other subcases in which player 2 exerts eﬀort regardless of player 1’s action, or
when he exerts eﬀort if and only if player 1 shirks, are inconsistent with (0,0) being the
equilibrium vector of actions, and we are therefore done. Q.E.D.
We now proceed with the converse of Lemma 1 namely,
Lemma 2:I fp satisﬁes IRS, then it is susceptible to reverse incentives.
Proof: Consider the following vectors of rewards for the two agents v1 = c
p(2)−p(0) and
v2 = c
p(2)−p(1). Under this reward vector there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which
both agents exert eﬀort. The strategies of the players in this equilibrium are as follows.
Player 1 exerts eﬀort and player 2 exerts eﬀort if and only if player 1 exerts eﬀort. To verify
5that this is an equilibrium simply note that v1 and v2 satisfy v1p(2) − c = v1p(0). Hence,
player 1 is indiﬀerent between exerting eﬀort and shirking given the strategy of player 2.
Furthermore, v2p(2) − c = v2p(1), which means that player 2 is best responding to the
action taken by player 1. Next, if player 1 is shirking, then player 2 is better oﬀ shirking as
well because v2p(1)−c<v 2p(0), which follows from the fact that p(2)−p(1) >p (1)−p(0)
(the IRS condition). It is easily seen that for any ε > 0 arbitrarily small the equilibrium
described above is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game. Consider now
the rewards v∗
1 = v1+ ε and v∗
2 = v2 + ε for ε small enough (it is suﬃcient to take
ε < 1
2( c
p(1)−p(0)−v1), which is positive because of IRS), and deﬁne the following new vectors
of rewards v =( v1,v2) by v1 = v∗
1+ ε and v2 = c
p(1)−p(0) + ε. Note that v2 >v ∗
2 because of
IRS. We can now compare the equilibria under the two mechanisms. Under v∗ the unique
equilibrium outcome is with both players exerting eﬀort and hence E(v∗)={1,2}. Under
v, on the other hand, player 2’s optimal action is to exert eﬀo r ta l s ow h e na g e n t1i s
shirking. This is because v2p(1)−c>v2p(0). Hence, exerting eﬀort is a dominant strategy
f o rp l a y e r2 .B u tn o wp l a y e r1w i l lﬁnd it optimal to shirk under v1 b e c a u s eh ei sn ol o n g e r
threatened by the shirking of player 2. The unique equilibrium of the game under v has
player 1 shirking and player 2 exerting eﬀort. Hence, E(v)= < {2} Ã {1,2} = E(v∗),
which establishes the result. Q.E.D.
The Proof of Proposition 1: follows directly from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
Q.E.D.
I ti si n t e r e s t i n gt op o i n to u tt h a ti fa g e n t sm a k et h e i re ﬀort decisions simultaneously
(rather than sequentially), then incentive reversal is not possible. In a simultaneous game
there may be a multiplicity of equilibria. However, it is easy to verify that if a certain
reward vector (v1,v 2) admits a Nash equilibrium in which both agents exert eﬀort, then
any increase of rewards for both agents will sustain this equilibrium as well. Furthermore,
if (v1,v 2) sustains only an equilibrium in which one of the agents exerts eﬀort, then a vector
of increased rewards will either sustain an equilibrium in which one agent exerts eﬀort (not
necessarily the same agent) or an equilibrium in which both exert eﬀort. This suggests
that information about peers (which is prevalent in almost every team environment) is
crucial for incentive reversal.
We now move to discuss the multiple-agent case.
5 The General Case
For an arbitrary number of agents the technology p may satisfy neither IRS nor DRS.
There can be, therefore, two potential extensions for Proposition 1. It turns out, however,
that incentive reversal can prevail under much weaker conditions than IRS. In fact, any
technology that is not DRS is susceptible to incentive reversal.
Theorem 1: A technology p is immune to incentive reversal if and only if it has
decreasing returns to scale.
6Theorem 1 indicates that it is the immunity to reverse incentives which is exceptional,
and not its susceptibility to reverse incentives. Only when the marginal contribution of
eﬀort is declining for the entire range of production can we guarantee that no incentive
reversal is possible. The proof of Theorem 1 follows directly from Propositions 2 and 3
below.
Proposition 2:I fp does not have DRS, then it is susceptible to incentive reversal.
Proof: We will construct two reward vectors v1 and v2 such that v1 <v 2 and the
set of players exerting eﬀort under v2 is a strict subset of the set of players investing under
v1. If p does not have DRS, then there exists some k<nsuch that
p(k +1 )− p(k) >p (k) − p(k − 1) ∗∗
Let v∗ satisfy v∗ > c
minj[p(j)−p(j−1)] and note that for a player who is promised v∗






v∗ for j>n− k +1
0 for j<n− k
c
p(k+1)−p(k) for j = n − k +1
c
p(k+1)−p(k−1) for j = n − k
F o rt h i sr e w a r dv e c t o rt h eu n i q u ee q u i l i b r i u mo ft h eg a m ei sf o rp l a y e r sj>n −k+1
to exert eﬀort, for players j<n− k to shirk, and for players j = n − k and j = n − k +1
to exert eﬀort as well. Furthermore, we argue that player n − k +1exerts eﬀort if and
only if player n − k exerts eﬀort. This follows from the inequality ** and from the fact
that for j = n−k +1we have v1
jp(k +1)−c ≥ v1
jp(k) ( w h i c hm e a n st h a ti ti so p t i m a lf o r
j to invest if n − k invests) and v1
jp(k) − c<v 1
jp(k − 1) (which means that j is better oﬀ






v∗ for j>n− k +1
0 for j<n− k
v∗ for j = n − k +1
c
p(k+1)−p(k−1) for j = n − k
It is now a dominant strategy for player n−k+1to exert eﬀort. Hence it is optimal
for player n− k to shirk because for j = n− k we have v2
jp(k +1)− c<v 2
jp(k − 1) (recall
that if n−k shirks n−k+1shirks as well). The set of players exerting eﬀort in equilibrium
is now {j : j ≥ n − k +1 } and it is a strict subset of the set of players investing under v1,
which is {j : j ≥ n − k}.W eﬁnally note that the equilibrium outcome will not change if
we replace v2 with v2 + ε =( v2
1 + ε,...,v2
n + ε), which establishes the result. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3: If p satisﬁes DRS, then it is immune to incentive reversal.
F o rt h ep r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4w en e e dt h ef o l l o w i n gt w ol e m m a s :
Lemma 3: Let p have DRS. Consider any decision node of player i after players
1,2,,...,i− 1 have already acted. Denote
7S1
i = {j>i ;dj =1at the subgame where di =1 } and S0
i = {j>i ;dj =1at the
subgame where di =0 },a n dl e tsk
i =# Sk
i ,w h e r ek =0 ,1. Then we have s1
i · s0
i.
Proof: We prove the claim by (backward) induction. The argument for i = n − 1
is straightforward and it follows from the fact that if player n exerts eﬀort when player
n−1 exerts eﬀort then he will do so also when player n−1 shirks, which follows from the
concavity of the technology. We now assume the statement is true for all players j ≥ i and
consider player i−1.L e tdi(k) be the action of player i after player i−1 chooses k,w h e r e
k =0 ,1,a n dl e tS1
i (k),S0
i (k) be the sets deﬁned above in the subgame where player i − 1
chose k,w h e r ek =0 ,1.
We will distinguish the following cases:
Case 1: di(1) = 1 and di(0) = 0.C o n s i d e rﬁr s tt h es u b g a m ei nw h i c hi−1 chooses 1.
If s1
i(1) <s 0
i(1), then it cannot be the case that i invests at this node (because by shirking
he will generate at least as many investing agents and will save the cost of eﬀort). Fur-
thermore, by the induction hypothesis, #S1
i (1) · #S0
i (1). Hence, s1
i(1) = s0
i(1). Consider
now the subgame in which i − 1 chooses 0. Because of the symmetry of the technology,
the equilibrium continuation at each player’s decision node depends only on the number of
agents who exerted eﬀort prior to that stage and does not depend on who they are. This
implies that s0
i(1) = s1









i(0). But if this is the case it must be
optimal for i to exert eﬀort after i−1 chooses 0 if it was optimal for him to do so after i−1
chose 1. This follows for the property of decreasing returns to scale of p.S p e c i ﬁcally, i0s
marginal contribution to the project’s success is greater after i−1 chooses 0. So it must be
that s1
i(0) <s 0









i(0) and hence because s0
i(0) >s 1
i(1) we have s0
i−1 ≥ s1
i−1,w h i c hi sw h a tw e
need.
Case 2: di(0) = di(1) = 1. In this case using the same arguments as above (i.e.,
induction hypothesis plus symmetry) we have s1
i(0) = s0
i(1) ≥ s1
i(1).F u r t h e r m o r e ,s0
i−1 =
s1
i(0) + 1 ≥ s1
i(1) + 1 = s1
i−1 and we are done.








i−1 as needed. Finally,





i(0) + 1 >s 0
i(1) = s1
i−1,a n dw ea r ed o n e .Q.E.D.
Lemma 4:L e tp be a technology with DRS and let v1 <v 2 be two reward vectors.
Denote by s1 and s2 the number of players who exert eﬀort in equilibrium under the vectors
v1 and v2, respectively, when p is the prevailing technology. Then we have s1 · s2.
Proof: We prove the result by induction on the number of players n.F o r n =2
the result follows directly from Proposition 1. Suppose now that the statement is true for
any game with n · k and consider now a game with k +1players. Let G1 and G2 be the
games with k +1p l a y e r sw i t hr e w a r dv e c t o r sv1 and v2 respectively. We denote by s1 and
s2 the number of players exerting eﬀort in the equilibrium of the two games respectively.
We will show that s1 · s2. We next denote by d1
1 and d2
1 the equilibrium actions of player
81 in the games G1 and G2 respectively. We note that following the action of player 1 we
enter a subgame
that involves k players with a technology p∗ = p if player 1 chooses 0 and p∗(s)=
p(s +1 )if player 1 chooses 1. In both cases the technology remains concave. We denote
by G1
0 and G1
1 the subgames of G1 following a choice of d1
1 =0and d1
1 =1by player 1
respectively. Likewise G2
0 and G2
1 are the subgames of G2 following a choice of d2
1 =0and
d2




1 denote the number of players




1 respectively. We now
distinguish the following cases:
Case 1: d1
1 =1and d2




1 it cannot be optimal
for player 1 to exert eﬀort in G1. Hence, we must have s1
0 = s1
1.S u p p o s eﬁrst that s2
0 = s2
1,




1. Otherwise player 1 would choose to exert eﬀort
in G2 where his reward is at least as high as in G1. This follows from the concavity of p
as player 1’s marginal contribution to s2
1 is greater than it is to s1
1.B u t i fs2
0 >s 1
1,t h e n
combined with the action of player 1 we have s1 · s2,w h i c hi sw h a tw en e e d .W en o w
assume that s2
0 >s 2
1. By the induction hypothesis, s2
1 ≥ s1
1. Hence we have s2
0 >s 1
1,a n d
combined with player 1’s action we again have s1 · s2, as needed.
Case 2: d1
1 =0and d2
1 =1 .B y L e m m a 1 , s2
0 ≥ s2
1. Since d2
1 =1we must have s2
0 =
s2
1. Otherwise, if s2
0 >s 2
1,p l a y e r1 is better oﬀ not exerting eﬀort at G2. By the induction
hypothesis we have s1
0 · s2
0 = s2
1.F u r t h e r m o r e ,s1 = s1
0 · s2
0 = s2 − 1 <s 2.
Case 3: d1
1 = d2







1 =0we have s2 = s2
0 ≥ s1
0 = s1 and if d1
1 = d2
1 =1we have s2 = s2
1 ≥ s1
1 = s1 as
needed. Q.E.D.
The Proof of Proposition 3 follows directly from Lemmas 3 and 4. Q.E.D.
The Proof of Theorem 1: follows directly from Propositions 2 and 3. Q.E.D.
We conclude this section by showing that incentive reversal may take a rather dra-
matic form if the technology is one of increasing returns to scale. For such technologies an
increase of rewards can paradoxically cause all but a single agent to move from exerting
eﬀort to shirking. This phenomenon is sustained by a domino eﬀect in which one agent af-
ter another realizes that his own action will not aﬀect that taken by each of his subsequent
peers, which induces almost everyone to shirk.
Proposition 4: If p has increasing returns to scale, then there exist two reward
vectors v1and v2 with v2 >v 1 such that under v1 all agents exert eﬀort in eqilibrium, while
under v2 only one agent does so.
Proof: We deﬁne v1 =( c
p(n)−p(0), c
p(n)−p(1),..., c
p(n)−p(n−1)). We argue that under v1
the unique equilibrium yields all players investing.3 Speciﬁcally, the strategy proﬁle is for
player 1 to invest and for all other players to invest if and only if all preceding players have
invested. To verify this note ﬁrst that p(n)v1
n − c = p(n − 1)v1
n and so by our tie-breaking
3In fact this vector is the one with minimal total rewards among those incentivizing all agents to exert
eﬀort.
9rule player n invests if all preceding players invested as well. If, on the other hand, a
set of preceding players of size k chose to shirk, then the incentive constraint faced by
player n is given by p(n − k)v1
n − c<p (n − k − 1)v1
n, which follows from the fact that
p(n)−p(n−1) >p (n−k)−p(n−k −1), which in turn follows from the property of IRS.
Hence, n will not invest if at least one of his preceding players shirked.
Assume now by induction that all players k +1 ,k+2 ,...,n a r eu s i n gt h es t r a t e g y
speciﬁed above and consider player k. If all players acting prior to player k invested,
then player k is facing the following incentive constraint: p(n)v
1
k − c ≥ p(k − 1)v
1
k and
k will exert eﬀort. If some set of players preceding k of size r shirked, then we have
p(k − r)v
1
k − c<p (k − r − 1)v
1
k (again because of IRS), and player k will choose to shirk
as well. This establishes that under v1 all players exert eﬀort in equilibrium.
We next deﬁne v2 as follows: v
2
j = v1




argue that under v2 it is a dominant strategy for player n to exert eﬀort. Indeed, because
of IRS, if player j0s best response is to exert eﬀort when k other players are exerting eﬀort,
then it is also his best response when r>kplayers exert eﬀort. Furthermore, because
v
2
np(1)−c ≥ p(0), it is optimal for player n to invest even when no one else does so. Hence,
investing is a dominant strategy for n. Consider now the decision of player n − 1 at the
subgame where all preceding players invest. If player n − 1 invests, his expected payoﬀ is
v
2
n−1p(n)−c;i fh es h i r k si ti sv
2








and player n−1 must shirk. Furthermore, if some of the players acting before n−1 chose
to shirk, then player n − 10s incentive to shirk is even greater because when k>1 we
have v
2
n−1p(n − k) − c<v
2
n−1p(n − k − 1) if and only if c
p(n−k)−p(n−k−1), which holds since
p(n − k) − p(n − k − 1) <p (n) − p(n − 1) <p (n) − p(n − 2) (where the ﬁrst inequality
follows from IRS). We thus obtain that player n − 1 shirks regardless of the action taken
by the earlier players. Using backward induction we can now obtain that all players j<n
shirk regardless of the action taken by their predecessors and only player n invests. We
ﬁnally note again that the analysis of the equilibrium will not change if instead of v2 we
take v
2 + ε for suﬃciently small ε. Q.E.D.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Externalities among peers in team environments can give rise to intriguing situations of
incentive reversal by which all agents are promised higher rewards while the set of agents
exerting eﬀort in equilibrium shrinks. We show that such situations can arise without any
behavioral assumption, and characterize the technological environment that breeds them.
While our model and results are based on full rationality, our analysis oﬀers an insight
i n t oad i ﬀerent type of incentive reversal that is behaviorally based. There is considerable
empirical and experimental evidence on psychological peer eﬀects showing that workers are
typically reluctant to exert eﬀort when they observe their peers shirking. This reluctance
m a yi nf a c tb eq u i t ee ﬀective in sustaining a high level of eﬀort within teams, because it
serves as an implicit threat against shirking. In such teams an increase in rewards may
quash this implicit threat. Some agents may ﬁnd it attractive enough to exert eﬀort even
when observing their peers shirking, which in turn may encourage these peers to shirk.
10This will give rise to an incentive reversal quite similar in spirit to the one described in
this paper. Indeed, it is one that may arise for any technology and for a wider range of
initial reward vectors. It should not be diﬃcult to generate such an incentive reversal in
the lab or even identify it through some ﬁeld data.
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